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The extractive industries (EI) are at a critical juncture. A period of 
significant commodity price volatility is intersecting with the glob-
al energy transition and, more recently, the major social, political 
and economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic – a com-
bination of forces creating both uncertainty and potentially major 
shifts in how EI are developed and governed. As EI governance 
practitioners grapple with these shifts, and the challenges and 
opportunities they bring, transparency will be an essential tool. 
However, practitioners need to think – and work – more politically 
as they develop and deploy this tool moving forward to make the 
most of its potential.
INTRODUCTION 
For decades, scholars and practitioners have grappled with 
the problem that, despite extractive industries (EI) holding the 
potential to be a major source of wealth and prosperity, their 
development often fails to live up to such expectations. A long-
standing commitment to building technical capacity of relevant 
government institutions has been complemented in the past 
fifteen years by a strong push to bring greater transparency to 
an historically opaque sector. Although attention most often fo-
cuses on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
many efforts have been undertaken by a range of actors working 
at global, national and sub-national levels to illuminate different 
aspects of oil, gas and mining sector operations and finances. 
The implicit logic underlying much of this work has been that 
greater transparency could inform and incentivize improved 
governance of the sector, whether by enabling greater ac-
countability or contributing to better policy decisions. We will 
argue that: 
• whether and how this logic plays out in reality, i.e., the 
extent to which some of the key intended impacts of EI 
transparency are realized, depends in important ways 
on political context; 
• political context can shape the ultimate trajectories 
and outcomes of EI transparency work throughout the 
transparency lifecycle;
• integrating political considerations more systematical-
ly into the design and implementation of programs and 
projects focused on EI transparency should help realize 
greater value;
• and all of this, in turn, should help sustain and reinvig-
orate support for EI transparency for societal benefits.
EI transparency: a moment of opportunity
As work on EI transparency - a large and important component 
of a broader governance of EI (henceforth GEI) field - has ma-
tured, there is now an opportunity to reflect on the track record 
to date and consider how to bolster and magnify the impact 
of transparency efforts in contributing to various goals moving 
forward.1 There is the added urgency and uncertainty caused 
by the global coronavirus pandemic and resulting pressures on 
government, industry, civil society and funders to adjust priori-
ties. Can EI transparency processes retain attention and resourc-
ing at this moment when they are arguably more needed than 
ever, but competing with other demands? Attention to political 
dynamics will be essential to assure they do. 
In terms of securing commitments to disclosure and increasing 
the volume of publicly available information, work on EI trans-
parency to date has been a major success story. The range of 
stakeholders now have access to more data on critical aspects 
of EI activities and flows, such as revenues, and it has become 
the norm for certain core pieces of information to be in the pub-
lic domain. There is a growing library of use cases for this infor-
mation. This is not to say that more information would not be 
useful to assure good governance of the sector, nor that the in-
formation published has been or can be used to the extent that 
many hoped. Some, including from civil society, have raised 
concerns over levels of “zombie transparency” and the ability to 
demonstrate governance and broader development impacts of 
transparency initiatives. 
Situating this Discussion
This discussion piece is one aggregation of perspectives, ideas 
and questions coming out of several years of expert consulta-
tions, meetings, and interviews undertaken as part of the Exec-
utive Session on the Politics of Extractive Industries convened 
by the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. The piece 
focuses on the ways in which political realities can shape the 
efficacy and impact of efforts to advance various goals through 
transparency of extractive industries (EI transparency). The au-
thors suggest that more systematic integration of political con-
siderations into the design and implementation of these efforts 
may minimize risks of “zombie transparency,” and reinforce ul-
timate positive impacts. It should help those seeking to use EI 
data for specific purposes, such as to reduce corruption and en-
hance benefit sharing; unpack monolithic terms; account for in-
centives along the transparency lifecycle; and realize yet more of 
the potential of information disclosures. This is an introductory 
piece intended to catalyze and provoke critical thinking, debate, 
further investigation, and, ultimately, practical experimentation. 
It will be accompanied by a series of blog posts authored by dif-
ferent members of the Executive Session and other EI experts to 
explore some of the themes touched on below in greater detail, 
e.g. through country- or sector-specific lenses.
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Why we need to address political realities  
more systematically
There are multiple factors that likely limit stakeholders’ ability to 
realize the range of benefits of EI data disclosures. Many of the 
factors conditioning these outcomes are technical. However, we 
argue that political factors are also critical to shaping the out-
comes of transparency efforts (including through their effects 
on levels of technical capacity) and should be more squarely 
integrated into strategies and approaches meant to foster and 
build on EI transparency. While it is encouraging that there has 
been increased attention given to the political economy of the 
extractives sector more broadly, especially in the past five years, 
we suggest that this focus should be deepened for specific is-
sue areas. To that end, in this discussion piece we begin to un-
pack how political factors can influence the effectiveness and 
ultimate impact of transparency efforts from the initial commit-
ment to disclose through the use of eventual data resulting from 
such commitments.  
Of course, as we turn to the matter of impact, this process nec-
essarily involves considering more explicitly the goals that avail-
ability of information is intended to advance, and the circum-
stances under which disclosures help address specific problems 
in order to advance these goals.2 Ideally, one should specify 
the mechanisms through which transparency is expected to 
contribute to particular goals and consider how to address the 
constellation of factors – technical and political – that can shape 
how these mechanisms unfold and operate.  
The following is an effort to map some of the ways in which po-
litical factors can influence the trajectory of EI transparency and 
data use efforts and in doing so, can shape their ultimate impacts 
and the extent to which they contribute to the realization of spe-
cific goals. The hope is to illustrate and provoke discussion on 
how thinking about political context systematically can inform 
the design of GEI programming to take more advantage of the im-
mense strides made on EI transparency to date. Building on this 
foundation, a blog series will follow over the coming months, 
exploring individual topics in greater depth and with a focus 
on thinking through how these insights on political context can 
inform and improve the impact of EI transparency and broader 
governance efforts. 
GETTING SERIOUS ABOUT POLITICS
In recent years, practitioners working on GEI have begun to 
pay more systematic attention to identifying and implement-
ing technical approaches to boost effective uptake and imple-
mentation of EI transparency commitments, seeking to secure 
credible and accessible data that is then used for various ends. 
By contrast, treatment of analogous factors on the political side 
has tended to be more limited and ad hoc, and not a primary 
driver of programming in the broader field. As the importance 
of political context in determining the fate of EI transparency ef-
forts becomes more apparent, there is a need to complement 
the technical lens with a political lens to illuminate how trans-
parency and disclosure mechanisms and requirements could 
and should be implemented and resulting information used 
more effectively. 
Traditionally, development practitioners have primarily engaged 
with the issue of political context through reference to “political 
will.” Researchers, practitioners and donors alike have frequent-
ly identified political will as a crucial determinant of success or 
failure of reforms.3 However, as  the “thinking and working polit-
ically”4 movement has underscored, both the simplicity of this 
term and the absence of systematic treatment of the universe 
of issues it covers are highly problematic. As Heather Marquette 
discusses in a related blog post for this series,5 political will as a 
concept is simply too vague and often treated as too fixed and 
exogenous to prompt an actionable agenda. Thus, with politi-
cal will dismissed as seeming either too broad or too difficult to 
address, too little systematic attention has been paid to under-
standing and actively addressing the ways in which political re-
alities shape the processes and outcomes GEI practitioners care 
most about.
The Executive Session on the Politics of Extractive Industries ex-
plores the implications for GEI writ large, but for this discussion 
piece, we ask: how does this play out in the context of transpar-
ency requirements and usage of resulting data? We suggest that 
work on EI transparency and data use could benefit from more 
consistent efforts to unpack political will and more systematic 
thinking about the ways in which power, interests, and attri-
butes of political systems shape both process and outcomes. 
We begin to explore some of these issues below.
THINKING AND WORKING POLITICALLY ACROSS  
THE TRANSPARENCY LIFECYCLE
Where we are meant to be going with EI transparency 
For better or worse, the bulk of EI transparency work over the 
last two decades has seen its value tied, explicitly or implicitly, 
not just to producing data as an end in itself but to the deploy-
ment of this data to advance broader goals,6 such as a reduction 
in levels of corruption, an increase in the public’s ability to hold 
companies and governments to account, or the improved use 
of information in development planning or implementation. 
Despite important process victories and expansive data pro-
duction,7 existing evidence is more limited when it comes to EI 
transparency’s contribution to advancing these broader goals.8 
Fears arise about the prospect of “zombie transparency.”9 While 
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to transparency are implicitly based,12 namely:
• Commitment – whether governments and companies 
commit to disclosures
• Coverage of disclosure – what is (not) included in dis-
closure commitments
• Implementation – whether these commitments are 
put into action through regulation, institutionalization 
and data production
• Data production and dissemination – how accurate, 
credible and accessible is the data that is produced
• Data use – whether, by whom and how data is/can be 
used
Specific manifestations of each of these elements underlie the 
theories of change or pathways to intended impacts for much 
of the mainstream EI transparency work to date, each feeding 
into the next. In theory, commitments to EI transparency would 
be made and they would cover relevant information, i.e. be tar-
geted to address informational needs for a specific purpose (e.g. 
to assure implementation of a policy). Once the commitment is 
made and its scope determined, it would need to be enacted  in 
order to assume some meaning in practice and operationaliza-
tion. This implementation would then lead to some sort of data 
production. Ideally this production should not only assure time-
liness, accuracy and credibility of the data but also its release in 
formats that are accessible to intended audiences. Finally, those 
intended audiences (and other serendipitous users) would need 
to be able to utilize the resulting information to perform a specif-
evidence of impact is complicated by shifting goalposts, long re-
sults chains and the challenge of assessing deterrent effects of 
transparency on behaviors,10 few experts would argue that there 
is no room for deepening the contributions of EI transparency 
to those broader goals that animated much of the field in the 
first place.
How we are meant to get there 
When considering the impact of existing EI transparency mea-
sures, it is worth noting that the goals motivating them (whether 
related to corruption, accountability, government take, devel-
opment outcomes, or otherwise) have often been inexplicit or 
broad and the mechanisms through which EI transparency is 
expected to advance these goals have been under-specified. 
This lack of specificity is likely often deliberate, helping secure 
buy-in to a process with a more technocratic framing - not ev-
eryone needs to accept the purpose is, say, to fight corruption. 
However, it has hampered understanding of the contexts - tech-
nical and political - in which these mechanisms would unfold as 
intended. This overview and accompanying blog series grapple 
with the political side of this last point: the ways in which realities 
of political context can shape approaches to pursuing sectoral 
governance goals through transparency.11
Politics and the “transparency lifecycle”
We will review illustrative political dimensions of each stage of a 
“transparency lifecycle” on which most traditional approaches 
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ic task or role(s) in service of improving outcomes from EI invest-
ment for the populations of host countries in some way. 
Theory rarely matches practice. Too often, these pieces do not 
fall into place as intended, a function of technical and political 
factors that heavily condition outcomes. Both types of factors 
need to be identified and addressed so that transparency can 
contribute to more accountable governance, less corruption or 
other GEI goals. 
HOW DOES POLITICS PLAY IN?
The following is an attempt to begin to more systematically 
grapple with the political factors that can shape how transpar-
ency unfolds at every stage. For each dimension of the transpar-
ency lifecycle, we briefly review the general track record of those 
efforts to date. With this in mind, we then turn to illustrating the 
ways in which political context may be affecting the performance 
and impact of transparency efforts in ways that can profoundly 
shape their ultimate trajectories even from the very beginning. 
Commitment: Who is and isn’t signing onto what
A. Lots of actors are taking first steps, but how to sustain, 
broaden, and deepen?
Over the last decade, numerous and varied actors have made 
commitments to redress the longstanding opacity of EI. Alongside 
the 53 countries that have formally committed to implement-
ing the EITI Standard,13 various home and host countries have 
integrated aspects of EI transparency into national and sub-na-
tional laws14 and policies,15 and transparency requirements and 
voluntary commitments now routinely appear in the guidance 
and standards of international actors, including financial insti-
tutions16 and some extractive companies.17 However, the nature 
of those commitments is uneven and who is (not) undertaking 
them is telling. 
Many transparency commitments are voluntary, only on oc-
casion crossing over into a mandatory legal requirement (al-
though, as discussed below, in practice even a legal require-
ment is no guarantee of implementation). Even when legislated, 
transparency requirements risk being “undone” through repeals 
and rollbacks, a reality perhaps most blatantly on display with 
the rollback  of the resource payment disclosure requirements 
of Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act and the withdrawal of the 
US as an implementing member of EITI.18 Ultimately, as noted 
in the 2017 World Development Report, powerful actors can too 
often intentionally withhold information they would rather keep 
to themselves under voluntary commitments, thereby perpetu-
ating important informational asymmetries (which in turn rein-
force power asymmetries).19 
In addition to the issues arising from the types of commitments 
being made, there is the issue of who still falls outside of them 
altogether: some of the most powerful global actors have largely 
steered clear of transparency commitments, including govern-
ment and corporate actors from China, MENA, and Russia, all 
major players in the extractive industries both as producers and, 
particularly in the case of China, as outbound investors.20
B. Politics and disclosure commitments
Where politics can come in. There are clearly ways in which 
political processes and the (mis)alignment of powerful actors’ 
interests – again, based on a variety of calculations – can affect 
the decision of whether or not to commit to some sort of trans-
parency measure in the first place, the form that commitment 
will take (voluntary or mandatory) and its likely durability. 
Most actors will avoid commitments that might risk undermin-
ing their power or generate opposition from other powerful 
actors on whose support or acquiescence they rely. Greater 
scrutiny enabled by transparency may lessen EI company and 
government discretion in decision-making and the pursuit of 
particular interests. This may well explain why voluntary com-
mitments have been easier to come by, why mandatory require-
ments like Section 1504 have been so vulnerable to attack when 
key government entities bend to powerful corporate interests,21 
and why some important players in the sector do not make any 
commitments at all.  
On the other hand, for some companies and governments (and 
more specifically, for key decision-makers within each), commit-
ting to transparency of some sort can be compatible with one or 
another of their interests or priorities, e.g., a quest for interna-
tional reputational benefits22 (translating into more and better 
investment opportunities); a desire to signal to domestic or in-
ternational audiences a genuine intention to undertake reforms; 
or the need to diffuse opposition or, during electoral campaigns, 
to inspire support. 
Of course, interests may not be consistent across the whole of 
government (or corporate structure); internal political dynamics 
will come into play. What serves the Treasury might not serve 
the Ministry of Mines or the Ministry of Environment. Willing-
ness to sign off on a commitment may vary across ministries 
accordingly. Some countries might require parliamentary ap-
proval, especially for mandatory requirements. The politics 
of securing that approval might prove a deterrent to making a 
strong commitment.
Implications for practice. Understanding whether and how ac-
tors undertake commitments is likely to be a good predictor of 
how the subsequent elements of the transparency lifecycle will 
unfold. Gauging underlying motivations and interests of relevant 
Getting the most out of extractive industries transparency - Discussion Paper
6  |  COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
government agencies and corporates can inform societal expec-
tations of what commitments might be made, how the case for 
transparency can best be framed, and where genuine support 
for and resistance to disclosure commitments might come from. 
There may also be ways to strategically capitalize on moments 
of political opportunity (and the circumstances that precipitate 
them, e.g., elections, scandals, or popular pressure) to get gov-
ernments or companies to commit to EI disclosures, as long 
as these are coupled with measures to buttress the durability 
and implementation of such commitments after the “moment” 
has passed.
 
Coverage: What EI transparency efforts do  
and do not include
A. Expanded coverage but who sets the limits?
Expanding beyond an initial focus on voluntary revenue trans-
parency23 and transparency of mineral supply chains,24 EI trans-
parency efforts now cover a wide range of issues and activities. 
The field has continued to identify key substantive areas where 
more information may help with governance and where less 
information may be enabling bad outcomes from EI. Efforts 
now include promoting greater transparency of EI contracts,25 
licensing26 and procurement processes,27 revenue management, 
and, more recently, have begun to take up issues like beneficial 
ownership28 and social and environmental impacts29 of EI proj-
ects.30 In recent years, individual countries have actively sought 
to build on and expand even beyond EITI’s expanding reporting 
requirements and recommendations.31 
However, key gaps in coverage remain. For instance, good infor-
mation on social and environmental impacts of EI projects has 
long been sought by civil society actors and communities, but 
has yet to be produced in a meaningful and systematic way, al-
though there are now moves in this direction. Information on 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) remains scanty despite their 
significant control over EI assets and influence over political 
decisions in many countries.32 While recently EITI has shifted to 
requiring project level disclosures, recognizing that disaggre-
gated data increases utility, other important gaps in disclosure 
requirements remain. Closing them will likely require both tech-
nical and political thinking.
B. Politics and coverage of EI transparency: decisions on 
what (not) to disclose
Where politics can come in. What is and is not covered by trans-
parency initiatives and disclosure requirements shapes the ul-
timate impact of these initiatives by determining what issues 
or activities are and are not open to scrutiny. Choices about 
what information to publish also shape, in turn, the potential 
scope of public debate – the data is often the starting point for 
multi-stakeholder dialogue; and an absence of certain data 
can significantly hamstring the possibility and reach of such 
dialogue. These decisions always have an important political 
dimension – those committing to disclose will be influenced 
by what they consider will be compatible with their interests 
and those crafting transparency initiatives and laws will have 
to strategically account for and navigate these considerations. 
Where EI disclosure has taken place, it has been a result of such 
strategic navigation.
Government officials and EI companies – their own activities 
typically the subjects of EI transparency requirements – play a 
central role in defining the scope of industry standards around 
EI transparency, national legislation and international stan-
dards. In doing so, they can sometimes shape coverage in ways 
that may prioritize their respective interests over disclosure re-
quirements that would most empower citizens or prioritize ben-
efits to the broader economy or society. For example, multiple 
people consulted and interviewed for this project felt that the 
exclusion of meaningful social and environmental impact data 
from most transparency efforts to date is due to resistance from 
governments and companies even though such information is 
typically among the highest priorities for communities and host 
country civil society. While there are steps developing to expand 
coverage to these issues they are far from comprehensive. Again, 
the interests of companies and different agencies within govern-
ment likely come into play. As those with first-hand experience 
tell us, the final requirements are often a reflection of the relative 
power of different actors, such as that of a Minister of Mines rel-
ative to that of a Minister of Environment and of EI companies 
relative to host governments and/or societies.
The distribution of power and interests across levels of civil so-
ciety can also affect the coverage of EI transparency measures 
and initiatives. Issues covered by global EI transparency efforts 
tend to reflect the advocacy agendas of international civil so-
ciety actors (typically from the Global North) over those of na-
tional organizations and the priorities of CSOs in capital cities 
over those in EI-affected communities – all of which reflect the 
relative distribution of power and interests among these differ-
ent actors. While there may be overlap and alignment across 
these varied agendas, this is not always the case, and the result 
can sometimes be supply-driven transparency without the req-
uisite demand to generate action in response to whatever data 
is produced. 
Implications for practice. When those with the power to de-
termine what is disclosed have different, at times competing, 
priorities and interests from those demanding the information, 
the likelihood that the data they choose to make available will 
feed into significant changes in policy or practice will be di-
minished. Ultimately, those championing transparency should 
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more closely scrutinize and account for the motivations of those 
deciding what to make transparent. Coordinated demands 
may have more prospect of influencing the coverage of trans-
parency commitments, as some national level EITI processes 
have demonstrated.  
If the realization of goals around accountability or sustainable 
development require local communities or members of national 
or subnational civil society to act on or mobilize around infor-
mation derived from EI data, the data needs to pertain to issues 
they care about most, the substance of which will vary from one 
context to the next. Efforts to support EI transparency initiatives 
may benefit from clearer mechanisms to understand and inte-
grate the data demands of different stakeholders (communities, 
CSOs, a range of governmental actors, etc.) and not limit those 
conversations to the periodic review of global standards. That 
contextualized articulated demand can then be a starting point 
for negotiating what is disclosed, while recognizing the different 
incentives of those who hold the information. Multi-stakeholder 
processes, if deliberately designed in ways that try to neutral-
ize power differentials and provide reasonably equitable voice 
to different actors, could prove valuable in mediating any com-
peting demands of potential users for data and resistance from 
potential suppliers to provide that data. 
Implementation: putting commitments in practice
A. How to match commitments on paper in practice?
While far from ubiquitous, as noted above, the number and 
range of voluntary commitments and mandatory disclosure re-
quirements and policies have expanded considerably and been 
adopted by a variety of actors. Despite the impressive volume of 
commitments, laws and policies, their implementation – translat-
ing commitments into relevant regulations, creating mandated 
bodies, and meeting disclosure targets and requirements – has 
been uneven.33 Problems with implementation can range from 
wholesale non-implementation, to partial or incomplete imple-
mentation to implementation undertaken in such a way that 
the de facto result is that “the transparency is merely notional.”34 
Evidence examined to date suggests that a considerable volume 
of transparency, accountability, and participation commitments, 
laws and policies have not been implemented effectively.35 This 
includes major implementation gaps even in countries that are 
in formal compliance with EITI requirements. These findings 
were supported by a recent analysis by NRGI of implementation 
of legal reforms related to EI in Africa.36 The study identified sig-
nificant shortcomings in implementing commitments to trans-
parency in many countries, most often related to social and 
environmental impacts and subnational revenue transfers, but 
also to the workings of SOEs, sovereign wealth fund commit-
ments, and compliance with fiscal rules.37 Such implementation 
gaps are likely not exclusive to governments and further study 
is needed of corporate track records on actuating transparency 
commitments. Any effort to improve GEI must tackle the realities 
of such implementation gaps that separate form (what institu-
tions and policies are intended to do) from function (how they 
work in practice).38
B. The politics of implementing transparency
Financial and technical capacity limitations can undermine im-
plementation of laws, policies and commitments related to EI 
transparency, but so can political factors: effective implemen-
tation relies not only on capabilities (themselves influenced by 
political priorities!) but also on the desire of relevant actors to 
deliver on promises.39 Simply put, when those charged with im-
plementation “do not see an incentive to implement a given law, 
that law will remain on paper only.”40 As noted in a 2012 analysis 
of implementation gaps by Global Integrity and the Center for In-
ternational Private Enterprise, “[a]ll the multiple reasons behind 
the existence – and persistence – of implementation gaps in di-
verse country contexts clearly points to one overarching theme 
shared among these different explanations: incentives matter. 
When an implementation gap occurs, its root cause is the fact 
that incentives – be they political, economic, or socio-cultur-
al – are misaligned or even counterproductive. It is therefore 
imperative to understand what those incentives are in order 
to diagnose why policies are rarely implemented as planned 
and to effectively address particular manifestations of the 
implementation gap.”41 
The incentives to implement laws, policies and commitments 
to EI transparency can be influenced by a range of consider-
ations, e.g., anticipated personal gains or costs associated with 
effective implementation; political priorities of the “agent” in 
question; political momentum behind a particular issue after a 
law has been passed or commitment has been made; or per-
ceived (il)legitimacy of the laws to be implemented.42 They can 
also be shaped by the influence of interests of other powerful 
political and economic actors who may oppose transparency 
for their own reasons.43 For example, among corporate actors, 
while some might support transparency in hopes it will project a 
stable and reliable image to international investors, others ben-
efit from relationships of patronage and kleptocracy that would 
lead them to favor opacity. We anticipate implementation gaps 
around EI transparency when the beneficiaries of opacity have 
more power and concentrated interests in maintaining the de 
facto status quo than others have in changing it.44 
Governments and companies commit to transparency codes, 
laws, or international initiatives like EITI for various reasons, 
which can bode better or worse for subsequent effective imple-
mentation.45 For instance, when commitments from powerful 
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voices within government or companies reflect a genuine desire 
to prioritize or advance accountable governance and improve 
sustainable development for one or multiple reasons,46 then 
meaningful implementation should follow (assuming the req-
uisite capacity is in place). However, we hypothesize that this 
may not be the case when the chief motivations behind com-
mitments are securing international or national reputational 
gains or responding to domestic political circumstances (elec-
tions, scandals, political pressure). Without a genuine interest 
in encouraging use of disclosures to improve sector governance 
and accountability, implementation could well be weak or 
fleeting, especially in the absence of strong consequences for 
non-implementation.
Similarly, the interests of powerful policy-makers in protecting 
themselves, their parties or other allies from greater scrutiny 
might create incentives for ineffective implementation47 which 
might take the form of non-implementation or partial imple-
mentation (which exempts key activities or actors from the re-
quirements in question).48 As McCullough notes in her analysis 
of environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs), when 
governments undertake commitments around ESIAs, even 
when they formalize these commitments in legislation, they 
are generally unlikely to implement and enforce them for two 
types of reasons: 1) the formal rules in questions are out of synch 
with informal rules that guide how things are “really done” on 
the ground; and 2) power relations that favor certain interests 
opposed to effective implementation over the general good rep-
resented in the legislation.49 Thus, misalignments with political 
realities on the ground can stop reforms in their tracks by pre-
venting their translation into meaningful practice. Similar imple-
mentation blockages can result from powerful actors capturing 
and neutralizing the policy implementation process, as was the 
case with the oil lobby in the US undermining Dodd-Frank Sec-
tion 1504 during the implementation phase.50
Implementation can also be influenced by inconsistent priori-
ties depending on where an actor sits in a government or com-
pany. This can exacerbate situations in which lack of clarity and/
or of coordination within the organization is already making im-
plementation difficult. There can be  a mismatch of incentives 
between those making commitments and those charged with 
enacting them. To the extent to which the interests of those 
committing to transparency reforms are aligned with those who 
are directly responsible for enacting those commitments (as-
suming coordination across the key responsible parties exists), 
one would expect greater support for effective implementation. 
However, one can envisage how the opposite might play out. 
For example, a government or company official sitting at the in-
ternational EITI table may agree to certain disclosures as they 
pursue the goal of winning international reputational benefits, 
but the official who then has the responsibility to provide that 
data may have competing incentives (e.g. a desire to avoid hav-
ing to justify and explain the information once subject to public 
scrutiny). Similarly, such disconnects can undermine the chanc-
es of successful implementation.
Implications for practice. Clearly, transparency commitments 
on paper or in law which are not carried out in practice are not 
the desired outcome for most actors in the GEI field. To secure 
effective implementation more attention needs to be paid to 
better understanding the underlying incentives behind this and 
considering more explicitly: who would be responsible for put-
ting commitments in practice; who/what influences them; the 
likelihood of their implementing a particular commitment at 
all; and the prospect of their doing so in ways that are more or 
less consistent with advancing desired outcomes. Project de-
sign should account for their interests and incentives – including 
those resulting from pressure from current beneficiaries of opac-
ity – alongside their technical capacity needs. 
This is not to say that the political prospects of implementation 
should determine whether or not capacity-building or technical 
assistance around implementation of transparency commit-
ments takes place at all. Rather, practitioners should consider 
how both can be aligned and/or shifted to support more dis-
closure commitments being put into practice. This might mean 
building in plans and incentives for more effective implemen-
tation from the very early stages, or developing mechanisms 
for monitoring that encourage implementation and introduce 
sanctions for a failure to follow through (e.g. censuring, loss of 
certain privileges or participation, some sort of financial cost).  
Data Production: Seeking Both Quantity and Quality
A. How to assure both quality and quantity?
The quantity of data being produced as a result of EI transpar-
ency efforts is often raised as evidence of success and is indeed 
a major achievement. There is now much more information on 
EI available than there was a decade ago, a significant feat for 
an historically opaque sector. Both through EITI reports and 
information generated by various national disclosure require-
ments, the volume of data on EI – in particular, on revenues, 
production data, licensing, and contracts – has dramatically in-
creased, even if this data is unevenly distributed across issues 
and geographies.51 
However, some stakeholders will seek further assurance on the 
accuracy of this information. There is growing recognition in 
the open data community writ large – not confined to the ex-
tractives sector – of the importance of the messenger in terms of 
how stakeholders perceive the credibility of disclosed informa-
tion. Some sources will be more trusted than others. It will vary 
across different actors. Some stakeholders may discount infor-
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mation simply because of its source e.g., a mining company or 
a specific government agency. One value of a multi-stakeholder 
process, therefore, is that it can increase trust in the reliability of 
information shared publicly.
Concerns over data accuracy may often be misguided. Howev-
er, we cannot ignore the potential for information being pro-
duced to be manipulated by those generating it, especially in 
the absence of neutral third-party verification mechanisms. In 
an age of active disinformation campaigns and wavering trust 
in institutions (both public and private), even when EI informa-
tion is accurate, concerns about credibility and trust in that data 
often persist. 
B. Politics and the realities of data production and sharing
Credible, accurate and accessible data is the cornerstone of EI 
transparency efforts and any related goals to which they are 
meant to contribute. Credibility and accuracy are both affected 
by technical capacity, as is well known. They are also potentially 
conditioned by the interests of actors charged with producing 
data and by the interests of those who influence them. 
When those who potentially would be most impacted by differ-
ent forms of EI transparency are in a position to oversee or even 
undertake the production of data, its quality and potential utility 
can be compromised. For instance, the interests of EI companies 
responsible for commissioning and funding environmental and 
social impact assessments – the production and dissemination 
of which is now a widespread requirement for EI projects – dif-
fer from those of the communities who would be users of the 
information. The firm – typically the actor funding, contracting 
with consultants to produce, and disseminating the findings of 
ESIAs – has an incentive to under-report downsides that might 
jeopardize projects or increase delays and company costs as-
sociated with them.52 Firms may also have a strong incentive to 
offer a biased representation of their social and environmen-
tal track records to host governments or communities, anoth-
er example of conflicts of interest in information production, 
a specific dynamic explored in greater depth in a related post. 
Similarly, under EITI or other government disclosure require-
ments, the role of government actors in producing information 
that could potentially reveal misdeeds or mismanagement by 
government officials can create potential disincentives to pro-
ducing full, accurate or accessible information. Beyond EI, the 
reality of such politicization of data is on stark display as lead-
ers worldwide manipulate the production of COVID-19 related 
data that they fear could have damaging repercussions for them 
if uncensored.53 Even the perception of such potential conflicts 
of interest can compromise trust in the data that is produced, 
thereby decreasing the likelihood that action will be taken on 
the basis of this data.
Political factors may also play into the formats by which data is 
released and timeframes. Those agencies responsible for broad-
er government data production and sharing - including open 
data platforms - may not have close working relationships with 
those agencies that hold EI data. EI transparency requirements 
may fail to specify that data be provided in open format, but 
simply stipulate that it be reported. For years, valuable infor-
mation in EITI reports was locked in PDFs that constrained its 
use and reuse. While some countries have made notable strides 
towards open data platforms (which also are better suited to 
timely reporting), one cannot discount the potential that delays 
in doing so may reflect not just technical barriers but calculated 
attempts to constrain use. 
Implications for practice. While the production of good data 
can certainly be undermined by various technical challenges, 
addressing conflicts of interest that can compromise data and 
informational quality, comprehensiveness, accessibility, publi-
cation formats, timeliness and credibility must also be a priority 
for those hoping to maximize the impact of transparency efforts. 
Whether this means turning to third parties for data production/
publication or verification, creating multi-stakeholder mecha-
nisms to monitor data production, creating incentives for accu-
rate and comprehensive reporting, or more proactively engag-
ing the actual data holders in conversations on what to disclose, 
there are various ways to potentially address the politics of data 
production.54 Therefore, it is important for practitioners to ask, 
who is in a position to influence the production of information 
covered by a particular transparency measure/initiative and do 
their interests align with the ultimate goals the measure/initiative 
was designed to advance? If not, what can be done to decouple 
powerful interests from data production? Pushing for open data 
formats for publication and alignment with broader government 
data policies and approaches may also increase accessibility 
and timeliness. 
Data Use: Where Significant Hopes of Impact Lie
A. How to maximize the benefits of disclosures?
For many observers, the impact of transparency efforts is deter-
mined at this stage of the lifecycle: whether EI data is actually 
accessed and used in service of specific objectives, whether in-
formation on misappropriation, mismanagement or mistakes is 
acted upon. On some occasions, increased EI data has revealed 
important discrepancies or simply previously unknown informa-
tion that was subsequently acted upon in some way. Transpar-
ency demands and heightened ability to scrutinize extractive 
project finances have led to several prosecutions in high-profile 
corruption cases.55 IFC-required disclosures for projects of its 
EI clients have been leveraged by local communities to pursue 
defense of their social and environmental rights.56  Journalists 
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and NGOs take advantage of EITI report data in investigations, 
for example to raise questions about license acquisitions and oil 
sale deals, that draw policy-maker attention to governance vul-
nerabilities.57 Gillies highlights the use of EITI reports to expose 
context-specific practices vulnerable to abuse and suspicious 
deals and transactions to investigate further, as well as their 
production serving a potential deterrent function to those who 
may think twice about undertaking corrupt practices that might 
be exposed.58
And yet, a common refrain among experts consulted for this 
project is that, despite the examples of data harnessed for a 
specific prosecution or policy debate, there remains significant 
unrealized potential for the use of EI data. Recent analyses by 
the International Finance Corporation59 and the Leveraging 
Transparency to Reduce Corruption project have both reviewed 
extensive evidence and argue that there is significant room for 
expanding the use of EI data for various ends, particularly in 
service of improving accountability and reducing corruption.60 
There is a risk of perpetuating “zombie transparency” in which EI 
data languishes unused or unusable and, over time, undermines 
the case for disclosure.  More optimistically, there is the possi-
bility of leveraging the EI data that is already being produced to 
much greater effect.61 
B. Politics and data use: getting to tangible outcomes
Across the field, there is now widespread recognition that im-
pactful data use will not automatically follow from the publi-
cation of data, but will depend in significant part on contextual 
factors. Without doubt, there are important technical impedi-
ments to uptake and accessibility that impede the use of EI data, 
issues on which a number of actors in the GEI field have been 
focusing their attention. For example, there are efforts to aggre-
gate data, simplify reports, remove restrictions to open data, 
address linguistic and literacy impediments to effective trans-
lation of outputs, address technological accessibility, enhance 
the role of infomediaries, and avoid over-reliance on online 
publication formats.
Yet, political factors also shape outcomes by affecting the like-
lihood, and consequences of data use by different actors to 
advance good GEI.62 The political mobilization that is often un-
derstood to be the crux of turning information into action, e.g. 
translating transparency into accountability, is not automatic. 
Rather, it is heavily conditioned by power asymmetries, compet-
ing interests and the ability of different actors to influence the 
incentives of others to act.63 These factors need to be more ex-
plicitly understood and addressed if we wish to see significant 
increases in data use and, in turn, more progress toward the 
range of desired impacts from EI transparency efforts. 
A fuller consideration of how these factors play out with ex-
amples is offered in an accompanying blog, but there are 
three key points to emphasize with an eye to designing 
transparency initiatives:
i) potential users need to have an interest, existing or devel-
oped, in the data that is produced in order to mobilize around 
its use. Without unpacking the interests (and influence) of po-
tential data users, we will fail to fulfil the potential of EI data dis-
closures. In considering data disclosures there is a tendency to 
bucket users, for example project documents might refer to “civil 
society” or “government” generically. The reality is that each is 
comprised of a host of different actors each with their own in-
terests, functions and priority problems.64 No surprise then that 
the data they need and are motivated to use65 (or to deliberately 
ignore) will vary. Those engaged, as representatives of any one 
constituency, in shaping disclosure decisions may in practice 
be prioritizing specific agendas and making their own assump-
tions about the data needs and motivations of others who are 
the ultimate intended users. Such disconnects will decrease 
the likelihood that data that is produced is actively sought out 
and deployed. 
The challenge is to gauge how feasible it is to anticipate uses. A 
problem-driven approach would point away from transparency 
as the starting point, but see it as a potential tool to be wielded 
in response to specific needs. Those urging broad disclosures 
would not want to cut off unanticipated uses of information. 
What seems harder to let pass is transparency efforts that make 
broad assumptions on use without testing those assumptions 
regularly and adjusting accordingly.
ii) potential user engagement with data reflects in large part 
the prospect of eliciting a response. While different poten-
tial users might see the relevance of certain datasets they may 
not use them if they feel that there is no prospect of eliciting a 
sought response, such as shaping a specific policy reform.66 This 
affects responses among and within different civil society actors, 
especially at the community level, where leaders face a variety 
of pressing concerns and will likely prioritize engagement where 
they see the most immediate chance of advancing their interest. 
IFC and TAI consultations in Colombia revealed this dynamic - 
mining communities choosing not to track available data on 
royalties as they determined they would have little to no power 
to shape applications to the central government for projects to 
spend those royalty funds.
Related calculations can play out within government, where 
powerful actors can choose not to use data in certain ways if the 
anticipated response it might evoke is opposed to their inter-
ests.Political factors affect information sharing and use across 
different levels of government (federal vs state vs local), between 
agencies at the same level, and even within an agency. An oil 
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ministry may have no incentive to proactively alert the central 
bank or finance ministry or auditor general to financial infor-
mation which might lead to awkward questions. Data that tells 
bad news has a habit of not passing up the bureaucratic chain, 
blocked by interested parties who risk being compromised if it 
is acted upon.
iii) the extent of civic space and de facto opportunities for peo-
ple and organizations to participate in political life without 
fear of retribution or physical violence can significantly de-
termine data use. Even when they have an interest in the data 
produced, civil society groups may not act upon data due to 
lack of opportunity or fear of the repercussions.67 As constraints 
on civic space deepen and evolve (currently exacerbated by 
COVID responses worldwide68),69 threats to those activists who 
allege corruption or fight for environmental protections are all 
too real. So, the most relevant, accessible, high quality data may 
still prove to be obsolete if there is no space to use it or poten-
tial users are immobilized by fear, as detailed in a recent study 
of Mozambique.70 Data produced in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
since the two countries joined EITI has been accompanied by 
increasing crackdowns on civil society - enabling what Oge has 
termed “mock compliance” with the initiative - the data avail-
able but without the reasonable expectation of it being used to 
inform debate, let alone reform.71 This chilling effect on poten-
tial users and uses can be felt beyond civil society organizations 
within media and even within parts of government. A journalist 
might hold reporting under threats of violence. An editor might 
resist publishing stories that will upset authorities and could in 
turn spark a tax audit or even shut down. A bureaucrat might 
feel the need to bury data that might show the government in a 
poor light if they perceive a real threat of career retribution from 
political leadership. 
Implications for practice: Those designing and managing ex-
tractives data-related initiatives should more actively work to 
enable data use, anticipating and addressing impediments to 
impactful use of information. This means better connecting 
data supply and demand by unpacking different constituency 
interests and analyzing how specific and potentially compet-
ing data needs match up versus current and potential data 
supply. In practice this would mean more creative and explicit 
“match-making” around existing data and more demand-driven 
data production moving forward for specific constituencies and 
purposes, thereby increasing the likelihood of uptake and use. 
To address the dampening effects on data use of pessimism re-
garding the possibility of precipitating change, groups working 
on transparency might consider how to increase costs/disincen-
tives for non-response. They can also incentivize better response 
by supporting local actors in developing strategic issue-linkages 
that might align better with specific priorities of government of-
ficials and thereby increase the likelihood of eliciting response. 
Finally, highlighting positive responses when they do occur may 
help build trust and faith in the potential for progress.72 
Finally, tackling explicit and de facto constraints on civic space 
must be a priority for those whose theories of change rely on 
civil society action or popular mobilization in response to data. 
In contexts where opportunities to use data to hold companies 
or government officials to account are highly constrained (or 
worse, actively discouraged or punished) and where institution-
al checks on government power are limited, we need to consider 
if there are other useful ways to deploy data (for example, via 
advocates in home countries) to achieve greater impact. In such 
contexts, is investment in data production merited? Do we an-
ticipate broader signaling effects of creating some precedent 
for transparency even if there are not immediate prospects for 
reform? 
Final Thought: The Dynamism of Political Context
It is worth keeping in mind throughout that across the transpar-
ency lifecycle, political context is not static. Therefore, snapshots 
of who has power over what and whom, and their respective in-
terests and incentives, need to be regularly revisited during im-
plementation recognizing that interests, personnel, and govern-
ments will change. Even under the most inauspicious political 
circumstances, an investment in the infrastructure for transpar-
ency may pay off when a political opening appears (and per-
haps even contribute to the emergence of such an opportunity), 
if designed appropriately. Can the supporting infrastructure for 
EI transparency be put in place to support such regular reviews 
and integrate them into EI work, including those mandated un-
der an international standard like EITI? We can learn more from 
the few projects, such as the UK supported Facility for Oil Sector 
Transparency and Reform project73 in Nigeria, that have deliber-
ately pursued an adaptive approach. 
CONCLUSION: WORKING POLITICALLY  
ON TRANSPARENCY
The road to impact must be paved with technically and 
politically sound approaches
In a relatively short time, EI across the globe went from notori-
ously opaque to significantly more transparent even in some of 
the most challenging settings. As the breadth and volume of dis-
closure commitments and data continue to expand across coun-
tries and across the value chain, there is a real opportunity to 
leverage these developments for a range of positive outcomes. 
But these will not follow automatically. Purely technocratic ap-
proaches will not realize the full potential of EI transparency. 
Identifying good practice, investing in capacity, and building 
systems matter, but so do power, interests and political process-
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es. We – whether government champions, corporate leaders, 
donors, or civil society activists and advocates  – should be look-
ing to anticipate and counter actions (or deliberate non-actions) 
that weaken commitment, limit accountability to implement, 
and impede impact. We should be seeking to identify specific 
openings and opportunities to foster data transparency and use 
for specific purposes. All of these should be more firmly integrat-
ed into project and program design for actors across the board.
Political realities can shape every stage of the transparency 
lifecycle. They can amplify or undermine the effectiveness and 
impact of EI transparency. There is already important work un-
derway to overcome technical barriers that shape the impacts of 
EI transparency – including support to both data producers, e.g., 
for improved data quality and access, and to potential data us-
ers e.g, for improved data literacy or communication. We should 
match that on the political side of the equation. So what might 
that look like?
Understanding where politics fit in
Improving our understanding of the significance of political real-
ities for EI transparency trajectories will likely need to happen on 
multiple levels. At a global level, we should further analyze and 
expand beyond the examples discussed in the various sections 
above in order to provide some high-level insights into the types 
of issues to look out for. As a starting point, we can aggregate in-
sights from and build on the growing volume of work examining 
how political economy factors condition the EI sector and out-
comes of efforts to improve its governance.74 These can range 
from country contextual analysis (often confined to the project 
design phase) to efforts to more systematically identify and ad-
dress the ways in which political realities inform decisions and 
actions of the range of stakeholders (including donors, global 
companies, home governments and INGOs) at each stage of the 
transparency lifecycle. We can also draw lessons from analyses 
of political economy and broader development and governance 
work beyond EI.75 
In addition to getting a better handle on the broad types of is-
sues at stake, at a more localized level we need to be able to 
produce more real-time political economy analysis that at the 
very least can illuminate some of the key allies and opponents, 
obstacles and openings for building on EI transparency in a giv-
en context. Again, there are some resources from beyond the GEI 
field that provide useful insights for getting started on this.76
Working politically
In terms of applying this knowledge to work on GEI, just as there 
is no single set of political realities in which all EI governance 
takes place, there is no one way to “work politically.” The spe-
cific approaches of different organizations will be determined 
by the local context, the specific issues they are hoping to ad-
dress, their respective goals, and the resources they have avail-
able. However, in determining approaches, there are already a 
range of options and resources for working in more politically 
informed ways on which to draw.77 
There are also already experiments that we can build on and 
learn from, including those that start with a specific stakeholder 
and problem and then consider what information needs they 
have, how to best access that information and how to support 
politically savvy approaches for them to use analysis drawn from 
that information to advance their rights. As noted above, FOS-
TER in Nigeria, as well as its sister project, Ghana Oil and Gas 
for Inclusive Growth (GOGIG)78 are two extensive examples of 
working politically on GEI in action.79  Such examples may also 
inform how broader, country-wide or multi-country transparen-
cy efforts can be refined. 
As more politically-informed approaches to working on EI trans-
parency are developed and deployed, it is important to capture 
and share lessons on doing so with the broader field. We are 
conscious of the limited documented examples of political fac-
tors at play, but remain confident that these are not reflective 
of their absence. Rather, they often play out behind the scenes 
and are hard to get acknowledged. (Certainly many EI Executive 
Session members and scores of interviewees had examples they 
could point to off the record.) Few have sought to systematically 
document them. We need to be proactively asking and talking 
about political factors - and, more importantly, understanding 
how they affect our work and thinking about how to deal with 
them. They are inescapable and they matter. 
Our intention in this piece has been to begin to open up dis-
cussions on both through systematic framing, illustrations, and 
preliminary thoughts on practical implications. Directly engag-
ing issues of political economy can sometimes result in norma-
tively uncomfortable and practically inconvenient departures 
from “the way we do things” as practitioners in the extractives 
governance field. However, if improving the impact, not just the 
existence, of EI transparency is the goal, then such aversions and 
inconveniences must be overcome and political aspects more 
actively embraced. 
This discussion paper was written by Leila Kazemi, Columbia Cen-
ter on Sustainable Investment, and Michael Jarvis, Transparency
and Accountability Initiative.
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